The Federal Reserve's role in retail payments: adapting to a new environment by Stuart E. Weiner
The Federal Reserve’s Role in 
Retail Payments: Adapting to a 
New Environment
By Stuart E. Weiner
T
he U.S. retail payments system is in the midst of a transfor-
mation. The shift from paper to electronics, the emergence of 
new instruments and payments channels, the rise in nonbank 
participation, the change in risk profiles—all are elements of this new 
landscape. The Federal Reserve takes as one of its mandates fostering 
a payments system that is safe, efficient, and accessible. How does the 
Federal Reserve fulfill this mandate in this new environment?
Since its beginning, the Federal Reserve has played a crucial role in the 
U.S. retail payments system. From time to time, that role has been reevalu-
ated, for example, in the 1980s with the publication of the White Paper 
and in the 1990s with the report of the Rivlin Committee.1 The current 
environment suggests the time may be right for another examination.
Other central banks are facing similar issues. The Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS), for example, has published two important 
studies in recent years analyzing the role of central banks in retail pay-
ments and payments oversight. The European Central Bank (ECB) also 
Stuart E. Weiner is vice president and director of  Payments System Research at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  The author thanks his colleagues at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City and Marc Andries, Ron Berndsen, Robert Lindley, Ben 
Norman, Simonetta Rosati, Jeff Stehm, Larry Taft, and Maria Iride Vangelisti for 
valuable discussions and information. This article is on the bank’s website at www.
KansasCityFed.org.
3536  FEdERAL RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CITy
has examined such issues and has recently proposed a framework for the 
oversight of card payment schemes and standards. The Reserve Bank 
of Australia has just completed a review of its policies with respect to 
retail payments, and the Bank of England would be granted explicit 
payments oversight authority under a bill recently sent to Parliament. 
Experience in these and other countries may be helpful in thinking 
about the Federal Reserve’s future involvement in payments.
This article reexamines the Federal Reserve’s role in retail payments 
in light of the evolving payments system. The first section reviews the 
changing U.S. payments landscape. The second section explores con-
ceptual issues inherent in central bank involvement in retail payments, 
covering objectives, roles, and economic rationales. The third section 
examines perspectives from other countries that may prove useful. The 
fourth section assesses current Federal Reserve involvement in retail 
payments, while the fifth section looks to the future, offering a frame-
work for thinking about key issues. The article closes with a brief sum-
mary. The principal message of the article is the Federal Reserve will 
likely continue to play an important role in retail payments. However, 
given the evolution of the payments system, the role the Federal Reserve 
plays and the rationale for this role may be different than they have 
been in the past. 
I.  THE EVOLVING U.S. PAYMENTS LANDSCAPE
It has become commonplace to describe the U.S. retail payments 
system as currently undergoing a fundamental transformation. But in 
fact this is true—unprecedented changes are occurring along many 
dimensions. Payments methods are shifting dramatically from paper 
to electronics. Payments processing is taking place amidst relentless 
technological change. Risk profiles are shifting. Market structures are 
changing, with rising concentration and controversial pricing increas-
ingly reaching the public spotlight. And nonbanks are becoming more 
prominent throughout the payments chain.
The shift toward electronic payments has been striking. The most 
recent Federal Reserve study indicates that electronic payments now 
exceed two-thirds of all noncash payments. As recently as eight years 
ago, electronic payments’ share was only 42 percent, and at the begin-
ning of the 1980s, it was only 14 percent. According to 2006 data, 16 Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  37
percent of all noncash transactions are now ACH payments, 23 percent 
are credit card payments, and 27 percent are debit card payments. ACH 
and debit card transactions are growing at particularly rapid rates—19 
percent and 18 percent, respectively, over the past three years.2
This shift toward electronic payments is both organic and reflective 
of new payments methods. Traditional ACH transactions—for exam-
ple, payroll deposits and government disbursements—and traditional 
credit and debit card transactions at point-of-sale (POS) continue to 
grow solidly. But Internet transactions; lockbox, POS, and backroom 
check conversion; and stored value, decoupled debit, and contactless   
payments also underlie the surge in electronics. And mobile phone pay-
ments may be on the horizon as well.3
A breakdown of ACH statistics is particularly revealing. In 2003, 
traditional ACH payments numbered 6.6 billion and accounted for 87 
percent of all ACH transactions. New, nontraditional ACH payment 
types—such as check conversions and ACH Internet payments—num-
bered 1.0 billion and accounted for the remaining 13 percent. In 2006, 
just three years later, nontraditional payments numbered 4.1 billion, 
and their associated share had risen to 33 percent.
Accompanying, and in large part driving, these developments have 
been dramatic technological advances in computing power and tele-
communications. One result has been large and growing economies of 
scale in payments processing. Another has been growing complexity 
and interrelatedness in technical and business relationships, potentially 
implying higher vulnerability to “single points of failure.”4 Risk profiles 
have accordingly shifted, with new sources of system-wide risk, opera-
tional risk, and fraud risk likely present in this new environment.
Central banks have long been concerned with systemic risk. System-
ic risk is the risk that the failure of one party in a payments system will 
lead to the failure of other parties in the system, having a domino effect 
that may eventually be transmitted to other parts of the financial system 
or economy. But system-wide risk is nearly as problematic. System-wide 
risk, a term coined by the Bank of England (2000), refers to situations in 
which a disruption to a particular payment system could have a signifi-
cant impact on that system, although not necessarily have repercussions 
in other parts of the financial system.5 Disruptions in retail payment 
systems, in particular, could have such system-wide impacts. 38  FEdERAL RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CITy
System-wide risk can arise from several sources, including opera-
tional failures and security breaches. In today’s highly complex, interre-
lated payments environment, an operations malfunction at one key firm 
can quickly be transmitted to other firms. Similarly, security breaches, 
identity theft, and other types of payments fraud can rapidly impact 
multiple participants.6
Industry structures in retail payments are evolving as well. One ex-
ample is the increased concentration of credit, debit, and ATM mar-
kets. The top three issuers of credit cards, for example, now account for 
over 60 percent of the total value of Visa and MasterCard transactions, 
almost double that of a decade ago. In the debit card market, Visa’s 
combined market share of signature and PIN debit has increased some 
ten percentage points over the same period, to over 60 percent. And in 
the ATM market, concentration ratios for ATM ownership, drivers, and 
independent sales organizations (ISOs) all continue to drift higher.7
A second structural change is the increased prominence of non-
banks in the payments system. Nonbanks have always been present, but 
today they are more visible and more prevalent than ever before. A typi-
cal transaction may involve more than 50 distinct payment activities, 
ranging from back-office processing, to routing of transactions, to the 
provision of new instruments and payment channels. Recent research 
reveals that nonbanks play an important role in virtually all of these 
activities and, in some cases, a dominant role. And this holds true for 
traditional payment types as well as emerging payment types. Nonbank 
presence is being felt throughout the industry.8 
In short, the payments industry has become remarkably dynamic and 
quick-moving, affecting all participants, including the Federal Reserve.
II.  CENTRAL  BANK  INVOLVEMENT  IN  RETAIL   
PAYMENTS:  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES   
Central banks throughout the world seek strong economies and 
stable financial markets. These goals, in turn, rest to a considerable 
degree on well-functioning payment systems. Central banks rely on a 
number of objectives, roles, and economic rationales in formulating 
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Central bank objectives and roles 
Safety and efficiency are the principal objectives of central bank re-
tail payments policy. Virtually all central banks stress safety, and most 
stress efficiency. Some central banks also highlight accessibility—for 
example, the Federal Reserve.9 Others add competitive conditions as 
an explicit objective—for example, the Reserve Bank of Australia.
Fostering safety in retail payments is typically interpreted broadly 
as seeking an environment in which economic agents are able to under-
take transactions smoothly and securely. In some cases, central banks 
use the alternative term, integrity, to describe this objective. Integrity 
arguably is a richer, more informative term in that it draws attention 
not only to the safety and soundness of individual payments entities 
but also to the safety and soundness of a payments system operating as 
a whole. A retail payments system must have integrity—it must be reli-
able, and it cannot be vulnerable to disruption or failure at any point 
along the payments chain.
Fostering efficiency in retail payments is similarly broadly inter-
preted. While rarely formally defined, most central banks appear to 
regard an efficient payment system as one that uses a minimum of 
economic resources for a given level of economic activity. Efficiency, of 
course, is influenced by such factors as technology, innovation, market 
structure, and competitive conditions, all of which are taken into con-
sideration to some degree by central banks.
Central banks serve three principal roles in retail payment systems: 
operator, facilitator (catalyst), and regulator (overseer). The level and 
type of involvement in these three roles vary widely across central banks, 
reflecting different histories, institutional structures, and legislative au-
thorities. As noted by the BIS, virtually all central banks play at least a 
minimal operational role by providing settlement services, and a major-
ity also act in some capacity as facilitators or catalysts (2003, 2005).10 A 
number of central banks also have explicit oversight responsibilities.
The operator role of central banks falls along a spectrum. In al-
most all countries, central banks offer final settlement on their books 
for some retail payment systems. Some central banks also provide di-
rect clearing services for some retail systems—the Federal Reserve, for 
instance, provides check collection and ACH services in the United 
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to government agencies, and some maintain databases for security and 
fraud-mitigation purposes. 
The facilitator or catalyst role of central banks also falls along a 
spectrum. Activities range from maintaining contacts with private sec-
tor firms, to conducting research on important payments topics, to 
encouraging and initiating various market outcomes. Central banks 
sometimes work with other public authorities in their catalyst role and 
also often draw on their strong relationships with their country’s finan-
cial institutions and banking and payment associations. 
It is in their role as regulators or overseers that central banks’ in-
volvement in payment systems has evolved the most in recent years. As 
the BIS reports: 
The concept of central bank oversight of payment and settlement 
systems has become more distinct and formal in recent years as part of 
growing public policy concern with financial stability in general. (…)  
It is only relatively recently that oversight has become a function that 
is more formal and systematic—namely a function whereby the objec-
tives of safety and efficiency are promoted by monitoring existing and 
planned systems, assessing them against these objectives and, where nec-
essary, inducing change. However, although recent, this development in 
the nature of oversight has been rapid and the function has now come to 
be generally recognized as a core responsibility of central banks. (2005)
As in the case of operator and facilitator involvement, the level and 
type of oversight activity vary considerably from central bank to cen-
tral bank. Some central banks have explicit legal authority and powers 
for retail payments oversight. Others have less well-defined authority 
and powers. Oversight activities can range from general monitoring of 
payment market developments, to establishing industry rules and stan-
dards, to onsite supervision of specific firms and networks. 
Specific information on the operator, facilitator, and overseer roles 
performed by many of the world’s major central banks is provided in 
Section III below.
Central bank economic rationales
Central bank involvement in retail payments is almost always un-
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cussed above. So, at its most general level, a central bank’s involvement 
is almost always grounded in broad public policy considerations. But 
often underlying these broad public policy rationales are more distinct 
economic rationales. Sometimes these economic rationales are made 
explicit, sometimes they are not. 
Comparative  advantage  and  economies  of  scope.  One  economic 
rationale underlying payments policy is comparative advantage and 
economies of scope. Virtually all central banks maintain reserve or 
settlement accounts on behalf of major financial institutions. Because 
of this, it is sometimes argued that central banks have a comparative 
advantage in performing intrabank funds transfer services—there may 
be economies of scope between maintaining these accounts and pro-
viding funds transfers among these accounts.11 This comparative ad-
vantage/economies of scope consideration, along with a near-universal 
concern over systemic risk (see below), is the reason why most central 
banks in fact operate large-value (wholesale) payment systems. While 
economies of scope are typically not offered as a rationale for retail 
payments involvement, the possibility has been raised.12
Market  failures.  A  second  economic  rationale  underlying  pay-
ments policy is market failures. A market failure is generally defined as 
a situation in which market forces lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources. This can mean that a given service or product is being pro-
duced at a higher cost than necessary, or that a service or product that 
is being produced is not fully consistent with the preferences of con-
sumers. Assessing whether a market failure is present can be a difficult 
task, however, and gray areas abound. In payments markets, market 
failures can potentially arise for a number of reasons.13 It is convenient 
to group these into three categories:  externalities, noncontestable mo-
nopolies, and asymmetric information.
An externality exists when the benefits or costs accruing to an indi-
vidual agent taking an action do not coincide with the benefits or costs 
accruing to society as a whole as a result of that action. Externalities 
can be either negative or positive.
One example of a negative externality is that associated with sys-
temic risk in payments systems. Systemic risk can arise from externali-
ties because individual agents conducting transactions in a given pay-
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or insufficient funds on their part could have on the system as whole. 
Central banks throughout the world devote considerable resources to 
monitoring and evaluating large-value payments systems and any as-
sociated systemic risk.
Another, related, example of a negative externality arises in the 
context of underprovision of safety measures in a payments system. Pay-
ment systems typically involve a large number of entities, including 
networks, banks, processors, merchants, security firms, Internet service 
providers, and so on. Schreft (2007) has noted that a data breach at any 
one of these entities could have a major impact on all of the others, but 
individually, none of the entities has an incentive to take this interde-
pendence into account when making security investments. As a result, 
safety measures could well be inadequate for the system as a whole.
A third example of an externality, this time a positive externality, 
arises in the context of so-called network effects. Payments products and 
services often involve networks that require a critical mass of partici-
pants on two sides of a market. For example, enough merchants must 
be willing to accept a specific form of payment for consumers to use 
that form of payment, and enough consumers must use that form of 
payment for merchants to install the necessary hardware and software 
to accept that form of payment. But because individual incentives do 
not take into account such “network effects,” such products and net-
works may not develop, even though consumers and merchants, once 
the product or network was in place, would benefit. 
Closely related to this are coordination difficulties. Situations may 
arise  in  payments  markets  where  coordination  among  participants 
would be beneficial to all concerned—for example, adoption of uni-
form standards, adoption of a common technology, or use of a single 
shared resource. But agreement on a specific standard, technology, or 
business practice may be difficult to achieve since participants will typi-
cally vary in size and preferences, and some may be tempted to “free-
ride”—that is, bear little or no cost—on any agreement that might be 
made. Such coordination difficulties are another example of an exter-
nality, in which the benefits to participants in sum are greater than the 
benefits to individual participants. The result is an underprovision of 
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A second type of market failure potentially impacting retail pay-
ments is noncontestable monopolies. Because there are large economies of 
scale in processing electronic payments, it may be cost-efficient for just 
a small number of firms to operate. But this, in turn, may give these 
firms significant market power, which can lead to monopoly or near-
monopoly pricing and provide insufficient incentive for innovation. 
If such firms believe they have potential competitors who could en-
ter their market—that is, if their market is “contestable”—competitive 
conditions could still prevail. But in the absence of credible contestable 
threats, economies of scale can lead to a monopolistic or near-monop-
olistic market structure.
A third type of market failure potentially impacting retail payments 
is asymmetric information. An example is when a seller of a payments 
service knows more about the security features of that service than a 
potential buyer (Schreft 2007). Naturally, the seller wants to highlight 
the positive features of the product but has little incentive to reveal any 
negative features, for example, poor fraud protection. If the buyer is 
able to find another seller selling the same service but with better fraud 
protection, there is no problem. But if such information is difficult to 
verify, sellers with strong fraud protection are unable to differentiate 
their product and hence have little incentive to provide this protection. 
As a result, this asymmetric information can lead to lower average fraud 
protection than some buyers would be willing to pay for.
Public goods. A final economic rationale potentially underlying pay-
ments policy is so-called public goods. A public good, once supplied, can 
be consumed by all without limiting the consumption of others. Because 
a public good is available to everyone, individuals have little incentive to 
pay for additional increments of the good since they will be able to enjoy 
any additional increments paid for by others—this is the so-called “free-
rider” effect. The result is an underprovision of the good. 
Some have argued that payment system safety and efficiency are 
examples of public goods and have used this line of reasoning to suggest 
a role for central bank involvement. At its core, however, is the more 
fundamental rationale of externalities. As noted above, externalities can 
lead to an underprovision of safety measures. And network effects and 
coordination difficulties can lead to an underprovision of efficient pay-
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III.  PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
As noted in the previous section, the extent to which central banks 
engage in the three principal roles of operator, facilitator, and over-
seer in retail payments varies considerably across countries. This sec-
tion provides specifics for a number of central banks, drawing on two 
important studies by the BIS (2003, 2005) as well as country-specific 
documents.14 While every country is different and generalizations are 
difficult to make, retail payment considerations—and oversight of re-
tail payment systems in particular—is increasingly becoming a priority 
of central banks. 
operator role
The central banks of all G10 countries and Australia provide settle-
ment services for some, although typically not all, retail payment sys-
tems. This settlement takes place on the books of the respective central 
banks. Depending on the particular country, payment systems making 
use of this service include paper-based systems, usually checks; direct 
debit and credit transfer systems; some debit card and ATM systems; 
and some e-money systems. Credit card systems, in contrast, typically 
do not make direct use of central bank settlement services, nor do post-
al and other giro systems. 
Although much less common, some central banks also offer direct 
clearing services to various retail payment systems. In the United States, 
as noted, the Federal Reserve provides both check collection and ACH 
services. The central banks of Germany, Italy, and Belgium are similarly 
involved, providing assorted check, direct debit, credit transfer, ATM, 
and payment card clearing services. The Reserve Bank of Australia also 
is involved as an operator but in a limited way, calculating the net set-
tlement obligations for a number of retail systems.15
In addition to clearing services, many central banks offer various 
retail payment services to other branches of government. And, at least 
two central banks operate databases for payment security purposes. The 
Bank of France maintains two national databases focusing on check-
related matters, while the Bank of Italy manages a database directed at 
both check and payment card incidents.16Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  45
Facilitator role
The facilitator or catalyst role is an important one for central banks. 
Most central banks have established close relationships with private sec-
tor participants in order to maintain an active dialog over payment 
system developments and, at times, to promote specific initiatives. In 
some countries, these relationships are formal—in Australia, Canada, 
France, Switzerland, and the U.K., for example, the central bank is 
represented on the board of the country’s payments association (BIS 
2003). In other countries, the relationships may be less formal but no 
less influential. The Federal Reserve’s role in promoting Check 21, a 
law that facilitates check truncation, is an example.17
Several central banks have been at the forefront of promoting in-
dustry change. The Bank of Canada, for example, was an important 
supporter of the public key infrastructure (PKI) initiative. The Bank of 
Japan has played an important role in establishing standards for pay-
ments infrastructures. In Switzerland, the central bank is represented on 
all relevant committees that propose and implement changes to existing 
clearing and settlement systems, and in the Netherlands, the central bank 
has been instrumental in establishing a more integrated retail payments 
infrastructure. BIS (2003) lists several additional initiatives.18
In  addition  to  promoting  and  sometimes  initiating  important 
changes in retail payments systems, central banks also serve as catalysts 
by undertaking important research projects. Central banks, because of 
their public policy orientation, may be able to study important trends 
and developments in an impartial way, furthering understanding of the 
payments environment. They may be able to draw on a range of other-
wise unavailable proprietary data and information, undertaking studies 
that otherwise could not be completed. Several important studies, such 
as the Federal Reserve’s retail payments usage studies, provide examples 
of this important catalyst activity.19
overseer role
As noted earlier, it is in the area of oversight that central bank in-
volvement in retail payments has evolved the most in recent years. A 
number of central banks—including the ECB and the Eurosystem na-
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Bank of Canada, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Reserve 
Bank of Australia—have reevaluated or altered their oversight stance.
Central bank oversight encompasses a range of systems, partici-
pants, and instruments, as well as a mix of different activities. More-
over, it is conducted under varying levels of authority and power. 
oversight  scope. The  scope  of  payments  oversight  varies  widely 
among central banks. Virtually all central banks oversee the large-value 
(wholesale) payment systems operating in their countries since these 
systems are viewed as systemically important payment systems (SIPS).20 
But several central banks—for example, the Bank of Japan, the Bank 
of Sweden, and some Eurosystem central banks—also have designated 
one or more retail payment systems as systemically important, and 
hence, they too are subject to oversight (BIS 2005, ECB 2008c).21
 In addition, some Eurosystem central banks oversee retail payment 
systems that are judged not to reach a level of systemic importance but 
rather are judged to be payment systems of prominent importance, or 
“PIPS.”  PIPS are defined as “systems that play a prominent role in the 
processing and settlement of retail payments and whose failure could 
have major economic effects and undermine the confidence of the pub-
lic in payment systems” (BIS 2005).22 This “prominently important” 
notion appears similar to the “system-wide risk” concept developed by 
the Bank of England, which was discussed earlier. Outside of Europe, 
other central banks—for example, the Bank of Canada and the Reserve 
Bank of Australia—have adopted comparable, broader approaches to 
assessing which retail payment systems, if any, to oversee.23
The scope of retail payments oversight extends beyond payment 
“systems” to potentially include payment participants and payment in-
struments as well. Some central banks include select industry partici-
pants in formal oversight programs—for example, network operators 
or payments processors.24 Other central banks directly oversee specific 
payment instruments.25 In some cases, a central bank’s oversight pro-
gram includes all three components.
oversight  activities.  Retail  payments  oversight  activities  can  be 
grouped into three broad areas: monitoring, assessment, and induc-
ing change (BIS 2005). Monitoring activities can take many forms, 
including evaluating publicly available information, requiring specific 
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inspections. The BIS reports that a majority of surveyed central banks 
can require the systems they oversee to provide information and to sub-
mit to onsite inspections. It also notes that cooperation among central 
bank overseers and other banking or securities regulators is desirable in 
order to avoid duplication and to share information.
Assessment activities are straightforward. In light of a central bank’s 
stated objectives, typically safety and efficiency, how is a given payment 
system, participant, or instrument performing? Central banks use dif-
ferent benchmarks and criteria to make such assessments. Three recent 
examples are found in comprehensive reports from the Bank of Eng-
land (2008), the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank 2008), 
and the Reserve Bank of Australia (2008a).
Finally, inducing change can be effected through a variety of means. 
Moral suasion, public release of assessments, voluntary agreements, and 
outright mandated changes can all be employed. Regarding the last, the 
BIS reports that a large number of central banks have direct statutory 
powers to require change (BIS 2005). This topic of oversight authority 
is taken up next.
oversight authority. The sources of authority that central banks 
have for payments system oversight vary a great deal. A number of 
central banks have their oversight responsibility set out explicitly, but in 
general terms, in broad laws or treaties. Examples include the ECB, the 
Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan, and the Swedish central bank. Other 
central banks have their responsibilities explicitly set out in consider-
able detail in specific oversight legislation. Examples in this category in-
clude the Bank of Canada, the Dutch Central Bank, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore. A third set of central banks has been character-
ized as lying somewhere between these first two groups in that “they 
have an explicit reference to oversight responsibilities in the law or 
treaty setting out their functions that is more detailed than that of the 
first group although not as comprehensive as that of the second group” 
(BIS 2005).  These banks include the central banks of Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. 
The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve fit into none of these 
groups. At present, the Bank of England’s payments oversight responsi-
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between it, the finance ministry, and the financial services supervisor. 
However, a bill has recently been presented to Parliament that would 
give the Bank explicit statutory authority and broad responsibilities.26 
The Federal Reserve’s authority rests on an assortment of statutes and 
agreements, described by the BIS as derived “from a range of statu-
tory responsibilities for monetary policy, banking supervision, lender 
of last resort, and provision of payment and settlement services” (BIS 
2005).27  
For those central banks that have explicit, detailed authority, the 
scope and range of their oversight activities are frequently spelled out 
in the relevant legislation or law. For those central banks that have less 
explicit or less detailed authority, the policies they pursue are more often 
self-defined or self-determined. But it is difficult to make generalizations 
because, in addition to different legal frameworks, countries, of course, 
have different payment infrastructures, institutions, and customs. 
One general trend that can be identified, however, is the move in 
recent years toward clarifying, evaluating, and frequently expanding 
the role of central banks in payments oversight. The ECB, the Reserve 
Bank of Australia, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Bank of 
Canada, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of England are cases 
in point.
The European Central Bank has broad payments oversight author-
ity and responsibility. Its mandate stems from the original 1992 EU 
treaty, which states that one of the main tasks of the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks is to “promote the smooth operation of payment 
systems” and, in doing so, “the ECB and the national central banks 
may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure 
efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Com-
munity and with other countries” (ECB 2008a). Over time, the ECB 
has clarified and expanded its role as payments overseer—always in 
the context of working with the various Eurosystem national central 
banks—by issuing such documents as oversight Standards for Euro Re-
tail Payment Systems (2003), Business Continuity oversight Expectations 
for Systemically Important Payment Systems (SIPS) (2006), and oversight 
Framework for Card Payment Schemes—Standards (2008b). Recent ini-
tiatives include studying the implications of the Single Euro Payments 
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also plans on publishing an updated, comprehensive oversight policy 
statement in the near future (ECB 2008a). 
The Reserve Bank of Australia derives its wide-ranging oversight 
responsibilities and powers largely from the Payment Systems (Regula-
tion) Act of 1998. It may “designate a particular payment system as 
being subject to its regulation, determine rules for participation in that 
system, set standards for the safety and efficiency for that system, direct 
participants in a designated system to comply with a standard or ac-
cess regime, and arbitrate on disputes in that system…(RBA 2008c).”   
Moreover, the RBA also has the power to gather information from a 
payment system or from individual participants. The Bank has been 
very active in retail payment issues, especially regarding credit and debit 
card markets. In September 2008 it published a review of the many 
reforms it has put in place in recent years (RBA 2008a). 
The Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank, and the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore have also seen changes in their oversight frame-
works. In 1996, the Canadian Parliament passed the Payment Clearing 
and Settlement Act, which gave the Bank of Canada responsibility for 
the oversight of payments and other clearing and settlement systems 
for the purpose of controlling systemic risk. Notably, the Canadian 
ACH system is one of the payment systems eligible for review under 
the Act, although to date it has not been so designated (Bank of Canada 
2008). In 2004, the National Bank Act in Switzerland gave the Swiss 
National Bank the power to set requirements for payment systems that 
could potentially destabilize the financial system (Swiss National Bank 
2008, BIS 2005). And in 2006, the Singapore Parliament passed the 
Payment Systems (Oversight) Act, which gave the Monetary Authority 
broad powers to gather information from operators and participants 
in any payment system as well as designate payment systems subject 
to the Monetary Authority’s regulations (Monetary Authority of Sin-
gapore 2006). The central banks of Belgium, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden are also 
operating under oversight regimes less than 15 years old.28 
The Bank of England is another interesting case. As noted above, 
historically, its oversight authority has been nonstatutory and shared 
with HM Treasury and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) through 
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a bill presented to Parliament in October 2008, the Bank would be 
granted statutory authority to oversee “recognized” payment systems, 
which in turn would be so designated by the Treasury in consultation 
with the Bank of England and/or the FSA.29 In a background paper 
authored by the Bank, the Treasury, and the FSA, it is noted that rec-
ognized payment systems would be of systemic or system-wide impor-
tance, and that some key retail systems, such as Bacs, would possibly be 
included.30 Under the provisions of the bill, the Bank of England could 
potentially engage in a broad range of oversight activities, including es-
tablishing rules and standards for the operation of recognized systems, 
conducting onsite inspections, and assessing penalties for noncompli-
ance with requirements.
IV.  FEDERAL  RESERVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  RETAIL   
PAYMENTS:  PAST AND PRESENT
Like many other central banks, the Federal Reserve has historically 
played a key role in the U.S. retail payments system. The legal founda-
tion for the Federal Reserve’s involvement in retail payments is found 
in a number of statutes, including the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978, the Monetary Control Act of 
1980, the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, and the Check 
Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003. The Federal Reserve has 
emphasized three overriding objectives for payments policy: safety, ef-
ficiency, and accessibility. In recent years, the term integrity has some-
times been used in place of safety to underscore the attributes of reli-
ability, security, and resilience in addition to safety and soundness. 
The Federal Reserve acts in all three roles in retail payments: as op-
erator, facilitator, and overseer. Its involvement as an operator is based 
on guidelines developed in the White Paper of 1984.31 The White Paper 
lists three criteria that must be met for the Federal Reserve to consider 
introducing new services: the Federal Reserve must expect to achieve 
full cost recovery; the Federal Reserve service must expect to provide a 
clear public benefit; and the service should be one that other providers 
alone cannot be expected to provide with reasonable efficiency, scope, 
and equity. The Federal Reserve’s involvement as a facilitator is usually 
self-initiated. The Federal Reserve’s involvement as an overseer is based 
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The roles and rationales for Federal Reserve involvement in retail 
payments have evolved over the years, as discussed next.
operator role
Role in checks. The Federal Reserve has been an active operator in 
the nation’s check collection process since its founding. Its early in-
volvement can be seen as a response to the fragmented nature of the 
industry. Nonpar clearing was the norm, and remote locations were 
inadequately served. It took a few years for the Federal Reserve to have 
a significant impact, but by the mid-1920s, the value of checks col-
lected by Reserve Banks had reached roughly 50 percent of the value 
cleared through clearing houses.32 By entering the market and ultimate-
ly becoming a prominent participant, the Federal Reserve was in effect 
addressing what now would be termed coordination difficulties and 
network effects.
 This rationale for a presence in the check collection business ap-
pears similarly valid in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Federal Reserve 
was instrumental in working with other entities to establish the MICR 
standard and to develop high-speed sorting equipment. In 1956, a sub-
committee of the American Bankers Association, with input from a 
number of industry parties, including the Federal Reserve, chose the 
MICR technology for encoding routing numbers and account numbers 
on checks. Subsequently, the Federal Reserve took a lead role in provid-
ing operational and financial support for developing high-speed sorting 
equipment that could process these checks. By 1965, high-speed check 
sorting equipment was being used extensively by the Federal Reserve 
and throughout the banking system.33 The Federal Reserve’s influence 
and direct operator role helped overcome coordination hurdles.
More recently, the Federal Reserve has been active in promoting 
truncation and check-imaging technologies and practices. Its goal is to 
make the U.S. payments system more efficient by moving from paper-
based to electronic-based systems. As an operator, the Federal Reserve 
has encouraged check electronification through its various product of-
ferings and pricing incentives. As a facilitator, it has encouraged check 
electronification by playing a seminal role in initiating the Check 21 
legislation (discussed below). In both instances, the Federal Reserve 
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problems as well as promoting greater efficiency in the payments sys-
tem more generally. Looking to the future, the ongoing reduction in 
the Federal Reserve’s check collection infrastructure and its continued 
encouragement of electronic alternatives appear well-grounded in eco-
nomic policy principles.
It is important to note that not taking an active role in a particular 
payment system or a particular initiative can also be effective, depend-
ing on the circumstances. An example is the Federal Reserve’s decision 
at the early stages of credit card development not to clear credit card 
slips through its check clearing operations. This decision helped spur 
the private sector to ultimately create an advanced electronic solution 
for the clearing of credit card transactions, a positive outcome in terms 
of efficiency.
Role in ach. In addition to its involvement in checks, the Fed-
eral Reserve has been a prominent participant in the ACH industry. 
In the 1970s it assumed a leadership role in promoting the ACH, and 
it became one of the key ACH operators. Initially, ACH volumes were 
low, and for a few years following the implementation of the Monetary 
Control Act, the Federal Reserve subsidized the ACH network. Its rea-
son for promoting the ACH was to provide an electronic alternative to 
checks for bank-to-bank small-dollar payments. But to establish such a 
system, significant network effects had to be overcome, which Federal 
Reserve participation helped address. High startup costs and the initial 
limited volume understandably made private-sector banks reluctant to 
invest in and use this new network. Over time, however, a critical mass 
was achieved, and today the ACH is one of the nation’s most heavily 
used retail payments systems.34
On network-effect grounds, it is difficult to argue that today’s ACH 
requires the Federal Reserve to be an operator. It is now a mature net-
work. However, a case might be made that the Federal Reserve should 
remain an operator for two other reasons. One, the ACH industry has 
become highly concentrated, with only the Federal Reserve and the Elec-
tronics Payments Network (EPN) currently acting as operators.35 Two, 
the volume and nature of ACH transactions have evolved to the point 
where, if not systemically important, the ACH network is clearly of   
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and systemic risk grounds, respectively, a continued Federal Reserve 
presence might therefore be warranted.
With respect to market concentration, were the Federal Reserve to 
exit the ACH industry, it is difficult to imagine an equal or more com-
petitive environment emerging, at least in the near term. The Federal 
Reserve’s presence in the ACH market clearly provides competition for 
EPN. And because large economies of scale exist in the ACH network, 
entry of new competitors is difficult. Future entry cannot be ruled 
out—a recent joint processing venture announced by Bank of America 
and Wells Fargo, for example, has led some analysts to speculate that a 
third ACH operator could emerge at some point in the future.36 But, 
for now, it is the Federal Reserve that provides the sole nationwide 
competition for EPN. 
The Federal Reserve’s presence, along with EPN’s, also provides in-
direct competition for the payments card industry, which some would 
argue suffers from a lack of competitive pressures. Recent developments 
have shown that a number of debit-type payments can be processed us-
ing the ACH, regardless of the front-end payment instrument used—
for example, checks, cards, and Internet payments. Thus, indirectly as 
well as directly, Federal Reserve participation as an ACH operator can 
help encourage retail payments competition and efficiency. 
With respect to risk considerations, the ACH network now handles 
over 18 billion transactions a year with a total value of $36 trillion.37 
Having two operators instead of one arguably enhances the resilience of 
the system, particularly if the two operators have backup capabilities not 
just internally but with each other.38 Moreover, by directly participating 
as an operator, the Federal Reserve is able to get a “hands-on” view of 
potential security and fraud issues impacting the ACH industry. Both 
points appear consistent with the Federal Reserve’s integrity objective.
Facilitator role
The Federal Reserve historically also has been active as a facilitator, 
or catalyst, in retail payments. As noted above, it played important roles 
in automating the check process in the 1950s and 1960s and in advanc-
ing the ACH network in the 1970s. In both instances, it accomplished 
this not just by being an operator but by working with a broad cross-
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agreement. In so doing, it helped bring about a more efficient, more 
accessible payments system.
More recently, the Federal Reserve has been active in initiating and 
promoting the electronification of checks through the Check Clearing 
for the 21st Century Act, or Check 21 for short. This act, which was 
signed into law in October 2003, is designed to reduce some of the le-
gal impediments to check truncation and thereby encourage the move 
from paper to electronics. The law “facilitates check truncation by cre-
ating a new negotiable instrument called a substitute check, which per-
mits banks to truncate original checks, to process check information 
electronically, and to deliver substitute checks to banks that want to 
continue receiving paper checks” (Federal Reserve System 2008). Most 
of the early work on the Check 21 concept was undertaken by the Fed-
eral Reserve, and the Federal Reserve played an important role in guid-
ing it to fruition. And in a short period of time, it has been embraced 
by the banking system and its customers—as of September 2007, more 
checks were being presented electronically than by paper.39
Finally, like other central banks, the Federal Reserve engages in a 
number of other facilitator activities that are rooted in efficiency, in-
tegrity, and accessibility considerations. These include participating in 
standards discussions, sponsoring industry forums, and conducting re-
search on payments system issues.
overseer role
Federal Reserve involvement in payments oversight reflects a mix 
of responsibilities and activities. The Federal Reserve’s “Policy on Pay-
ments System Risk” (2007b) provides guidance on principles and mini-
mum standards for managing risk in systemically important payments, 
based on the BIS Core Principles and other international guidelines for 
securities settlement systems and central counterparties. The policy ap-
plies to public and private-sector payments and settlement systems that 
expect to settle a daily aggregate gross value of transactions exceeding 
$5 billion on any given day. Where the Federal Reserve has authority 
over an applicable system, it is guided by this policy in its oversight; 
where it does not have such authority, the Federal Reserve offers to 
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In addition, the Federal Reserve has oversight responsibilities un-
der the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978 and the Expedited Funds 
Availability Act of 1987. Under the former, the Federal Reserve is au-
thorized to establish regulations regarding the rights and responsibili-
ties of consumers using various electronic payments; these regulations 
are issued in Regulation E. Under the latter, the Federal Reserve is au-
thorized to establish regulations for the collection of all checks; these 
regulations are issued in Regulation CC.41
As part of its prudential supervision programs, which are aimed 
at monitoring the health and operation of individual banks and bank 
holding companies, the Federal Reserve can examine various payments 
activities of banks, including those associated with ACH, wire service, 
and payment cards. And under the Bank Service Company Act of 
1962, the Federal Reserve and other supervisory agencies can examine 
nonbank service companies to whom banks outsource specified finan-
cial services, including payments services. The TSP (technology service 
providers) program is operated under the auspices of this act, enabling 
the Federal Reserve, in cooperation with other agencies, to monitor 
some of the nation’s largest nonbank payments providers.42
V.   FEDERAL  RESERVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  RETAIL   
PAYMENTS:  FUTURE
The evolving retail payments system suggests that this may be an 
opportune time to rethink the Federal Reserve’s retail payments policy. 
As noted in Section III, many other central banks are pursuing similar 
reexaminations. The Federal Reserve could elect to maintain its current 
policies, preserving the scope and level of activity in its three roles of 
operator, facilitator, and overseer. Or the Federal Reserve could elect to 
alter its policies, scaling back or expanding its scope or level of activity 
where conditions warrant. In either case, it would be useful for the Fed-
eral Reserve to have a systematic framework for assessing whether, and 
to what extent, to alter its retail payments policies. Such a framework 
would give the Federal Reserve a consistent, analytically rigorous way 
of making decisions on potential policy changes.
This section outlines a possible framework. The framework contains 
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Criteria for involvement
The first question to ask is, Under what circumstances should the 
Federal Reserve consider altering its payments policy, either expanding 
or contracting activities? One can envision two core criteria, one or 
both of which would be expected to be met, for the Federal Reserve to 
revise its policy: 1) Does the change in policy address a market failure? 
2) Does the change in policy advance one or more of the overriding 
objectives of efficiency, integrity, and accessibility?
 One point to make is that these two criteria will sometimes over-
lap:  for  example,  market  failure  and  efficiency  considerations  will 
sometimes be one and the same. A second point to make is that, while 
in some instances both criteria would be expected to be met, one can 
also envision cases in which market failure was not at issue but one or 
more of the general objectives was. Situations could arise in which a 
proposed policy change was judged to enhance efficiency, integrity, or 
accessibility, even though there was no obvious market failure. So meet-
ing one, but not necessarily both, of the core criteria (and more often 
than not, it being the second criterion) might be an approach for the 
Federal Reserve to consider adopting. 
A third point to make is there also may be cases in which there are 
tradeoffs among the three general objectives of efficiency, integrity, and 
accessibility. For example, a proposed policy might advance accessibil-
ity but at the expense of some efficiency. In such cases, policymakers 
would need to assess net costs and benefits.
Type of involvement
The second question to ask is, If the criteria are met for the Federal 
Reserve to alter its retail payments policy, how exactly should Federal 
Reserve involvement be changed? This, in turn, involves two subsidiary 
questions: 1) What role (operator, facilitator, or overseer) should the 
Federal Reserve adopt? 2) To what extent, that is, at what level of activ-
ism, should the Federal Reserve respond?
The choice of operator, facilitator, or overseer, of course, will de-
pend critically on the specific market failure or general objective being 
addressed. And, of course, some policy changes would presumably in-
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Tied to the choice of role is the choice of level of activism within a 
role.  In all three of its roles, the Federal Reserve would typically face a 
continuum of activism. The point it would choose on that continuum 
would depend on several factors, including the assessed degree of market 
failure, the anticipated private sector response, the reversibility or irre-
versibility of planned investments, and potential financial risks for the 
Federal Reserve. Cost considerations would also be key. Cost recovery 
presumably would be required for services and activities for which the 
Federal Reserve had private sector competition, while cost effectiveness 
would be required for services and activities that were public in nature.
VI.  SUMMARY
The U.S. retail payments system is evolving rapidly. Electronic 
payments have become the norm. New technologies, new participants, 
and new market structures have become the norm as well. It is not far-
fetched to suggest that the payments landscape has changed more in 
the last decade than in the entire half-century preceding it. 
Around the world, central banks’ payments policies are evolving 
equally rapidly. Recognizing the significant changes underway, many 
central banks have been reevaluating their roles in their respective pay-
ment systems. Their experience should prove helpful to the Federal 
Reserve as it reexamines its role in this new environment.58  FEdERAL RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CITy
ENDNOTES
1The White Paper, entitled “The Federal Reserve in the Payment System,” 
was issued by the Board of Governors in 1984 and revised in 1990. It describes 
the Federal Reserve’s “general policy regarding its role in the payments system” 
(Federal Reserve System 1984). The Rivlin Committee was appointed by Chair-
man Greenspan in 1996 to examine payment services provided by the Federal 
Reserve to depository institutions. The Committee’s report, entitled “The Federal 
Reserve in the Payments Mechanism,” was issued in 1998 and recommended that 
the Federal Reserve remain a provider of both check collection and ACH services 
(Federal Reserve System 1998). The report, however, was never officially adopted 
by the Board of Governors.
2See Federal Reserve System (2007a) and Gerdes and Walton (2002).
3The outlook for mobile payments is discussed by Bradford and Hayashi (2007).
4An example is a common reliance on a particular technology; for discussion, 
see Bank of England (2000).
5The impact of the September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. check-clear-
ing system might be considered an example.
6See Schreft (2007) and Sullivan (2007) for discussions of payments security issues. 
7Concentration in credit and debit card markets and the recent controversies 
over interchange pricing are discussed by Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2006). 
8For a full discussion of nonbanks in the payments system, see European 
Central Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2007a, 2007b).
9Regarding accessibility, the White Paper states that the Federal Reserve seeks 
“to ensure the provision of payments services to all depository institutions on an 
equitable basis, and to do so in an atmosphere of competitive fairness” (Federal 
Reserve System 1984).
10The remainder of this subsection draws in part on BIS (2003, 2005).
11See Green and Todd (2001) for discussion.
12See Stern (2005).
13Lacker (2005) provides a contrary view, arguing that market failures are 
largely absent from payments markets.
14Recent publications from central banks on retail payments involvement in-
clude Bank of Canada (2008), Bank of England (2008, 2000), De Nederlandsche 
Bank (2008, 2007), European Central Bank (2008a, 2008b, 2006, 2005, 2003), 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (2006), Reserve Bank of Australia (2008a, 
2008b, 2008c), and Swiss National Bank (2008).
15Table 1 in BIS (2003) provides a list of settlement and clearing activities of 
the G10 and Australian central banks. 
16See Banque de France (2008) and Banca d’Italia (2008).
17Check 21 is discussed further in Section IV.
18See Box 2 in BIS (2003).Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  59
19The most recent usage study is Federal Reserve (2007a). Another research 
project example is the joint ECB/Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City study on 
nonbanks in the payments system, in which the ECB and participating Eurosys-
tem national central banks were able to gather important industry data for vari-
ous European payment systems. See European Central Bank and Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City (2007).
20In cases of systemically important payment systems, the BIS core principles 
typically form the basis for oversight evaluations (BIS 2005). In some countries— 
for example, the UK and Switzerland—so-called risk-based oversight is also being 
applied to some extent (see, for example, Bank of England (2008)). 
21Six retail payment systems in the Eurosystem—in France, Ireland (2), Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, and Finland—are currently classified as SIPS (ECB 
2008c). The alternative term “SIRP” (Systemically Important Retail Payment Sys-
tem) is sometimes used in Eurosystem publications, e.g. ECB (2005).
22Seven retail payments systems in the Eurosystem—in Belgium, Greece (2), 
Spain, Italy, Portugal, and STEP 2—are currently classified as PIPS (ECB 2008c). 
The alternative term “PIRP” (Prominently Important Retail Payment System) is 
sometimes used in Eurosystem publications, e.g. ECB (2005).
23The Bank of Canada, for example, has identified the Canadian ACH sys-
tem as potentially subject to oversight, although its most recent assessment is not 
to do so (Bank of Canada 2008). In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia over-
sees a large part of the retail payments system (Reserve Bank of Australia 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c).
24An example is the Federal Reserve’s participation in the TSP (technology 
service providers) program covering a limited number of nonbank payments firms, 
conducted in cooperation with other federal supervisory agencies. See European 
Central Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2007).
25BIS (2005) reports that “nine central banks regard themselves as directly 
overseeing payment instruments in some way that is distinct from their oversight 
of systems per se (Belgium, the ECB, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Sweden, and the United States).”
26Specifics of the proposed bill are discussed later in this section.
27The Federal Reserve’s involvement in oversight is discussed in more detail 
in Section IV.
28For a summary of the sources of other central banks’ oversight responsibili-
ties and powers, see Annex 1 in BIS (2005).
29The bill is formally known as Banking Bill 2007-2008; see United King-
dom Parliament (2008).
30See Bank of England, HM Treasury, and FSA (2008).
31See Federal Reserve System (1984).
32See Connolly and Eisenmenger (2000) for further discussion.
33See Connolly and Eisenmenger (2000) for further discussion.60  FEdERAL RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CITy
34See Connolly and Eisenmenger (2000) and National Commission (1977) 
for a history of the Federal Reserve’s involvement in ACH. 
35EPN is part of The Clearing House Payments Company.
36See Bills (2008).
37Figures are taken from NACHA (2008a). It is worth noting that the ACH 
network is no longer just a “small-dollar” network—some very large transactions 
pass over the ACH network, blurring the distinction between wholesale and retail 
payment systems.
38Thus, the argument here is that the Federal Reserve’s operator presence 
in ACH likely helps the ACH system be more resilient and robust in situations 
where backup provisions become necessary. Extending this line of reasoning, it 
may be useful to explore whether the Federal Reserve’s ACH network could be 
used as a “switch of last resort” in the event of major disruption to another retail 
payments system, for example, a credit or debit card network. Hoenig raises this 
possibility in Hoenig (2000, 2007).
39The GAO has recently reviewed the Check 21 Act in U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2008).
40For further discussion, see European Central Bank and Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City (2007a, 2007b) and Stehm (2006). 
41For further discussion, see Connolly and Eisenmenger (2000).
42For further discussion, see European Central Bank and Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City (2007a, 2007b) and Sullivan (2007). Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  61
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